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This paper develops tools and techniques to study the impact of exogenous changes in factor supply
and factor demand on factor allocation and factor prices in economies with a large number of goods
and factors. The main results of our paper characterize sufficient conditions for robust monotone comparative
statics predictions in a Roy-like assignment model. These general results are then used to generate
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we develop tools and techniques to study the impact of exogenous changes in
factor supply and factor demand on factor allocation and factor prices in economies with a
large number of goods and factors. We then demonstrate how these tools and techniques
can be applied to generate new insights about the consequences of globalization.
Understanding the determinants of factor allocation and factor prices in economies with
a large number of goods and factors is important for at least two reasons. First, large
changes in factor allocation and factor prices do occur at high levels of disaggregation in
practice. For instance, a number of authors in the labor and public ￿nance literatures have
documented: (i) large changes in inequality at the top of the income distribution, Piketty
and Saez (2003); (ii) divergent trends in inequality in the top and in the bottom halves of the
income distribution, Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008); (iii) divergent trends in employment
growth of high- and low-wage occupations, Goos and Manning (2007); and (iv) changes in
both between- and within-group inequality, Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993). Second, even
changes occurring at low levels of disaggregation, such as variations in the relative wage of
college to non-college graduates, often re￿ ect average changes taken over a large number of
imperfectly substitutable factors. To analyze all these phenomena, we need a model with
more than two goods and two factors.
Section 2 introduces our theoretical framework. The starting point of our analysis is a
Roy-like assignment model in which a continuum of workers, with di⁄erent skills, are matched
to a continuum of intermediate goods or tasks, with di⁄erent skill intensities. These tasks
are then combined into a unique ￿nal good using a CES aggregator. All good and labor
markets are perfectly competitive.
Section 3 presents tools and techniques to derive robust monotone comparative stat-
ics predictions in this environment. We ￿rst introduce de￿nitions of skill abundance and
skill diversity to conceptualize changes in factor supply, and de￿nitions of skill-biased and
extreme-biased technologies to conceptualize changes in factor demand. These de￿nitions
do not rely on any functional form assumption, but rely instead on standard concepts in
information economics; see e.g. Milgrom (1981). They naturally extend standard notions of
relative factor supply and demand from two-good-two-factor models to models with a large
number of goods and factors. Using these concepts, we then derive su¢ cient conditions for
various patterns of changes in factor prices￿ e.g. pervasive changes in inequality￿ and factor
allocation￿ e.g. job polarization￿ to occur in a closed economy.Matching and Inequality 3
Section 4 uses these general results to shed light on the consequences of globalization.
We consider a world economy comprising two countries. Building on our closed economy
comparative statics, we ￿rst analyze the impact of North-South trade, which we model as
trade between countries which di⁄er in: (i) skill abundance; or (ii) the skill bias of their
technologies. When North-South trade is driven by di⁄erences in factor endowments, we
obtain continuum-by-continuum extensions of the classic two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin results.
In particular, trade integration induces skill downgrading and a pervasive rise in inequality
in the North; the converse is true in the South. Perhaps surprisingly, when North-South
trade is driven by di⁄erences in technological biases, we show that the exact same logic leads
to the exact opposite conclusion.
This observation, which arises naturally in the context of our model, implies that predic-
tions regarding the impact of trade integration crucially depend on the correlation between
factor endowment and technological di⁄erences. In a series of in￿ uential papers, see e.g.
Acemoglu (1998) and Acemoglu (2003), Acemoglu argues that skill-abundant countries tend
to use skill-biased technologies. With this correlation in mind, we should not be surprised
if: (i) similar countries have di⁄erent globalization experiences depending on which of these
two forces, supply or demand, dominates; and (ii) the overall e⁄ect of trade liberalization
on factor allocation and factor prices tends to be small in practice.
Another bene￿t of our theoretical framework is that it permits an integrated analysis of
North-South and North-North trade. Since we have more than two factors, we can model
North-North trade as trade between a more and a less diverse country. As Grossman and
Maggi (2000) ￿rst emphasized, the notion of diversity￿ where one country is more diverse
than another if it has relatively more workers of extreme skills￿ is important because it
allows us to think about the implications of trade between countries with similar average
skill levels. While this accounts for the vast majority of world trade, the standard Heckscher-
Ohlin model has nothing to say about its implications for inequality.1 By contrast, our model
predicts that North-North trade integration induces job and wage polarization in the more
diverse country. The converse is true in the less diverse country.
Compared to North-South trade, North-North trade may either increase or decrease the
relative wage between high- and low-skill workers as well as the relative price of the goods
they produce. The consequences of North-North trade are to be found at a higher level of
1The most common approach to explain North-North trade is the so-called ￿new￿ trade theory; see
Helpman and Krugman (1985). Its implications for inequality, however, are the same as in the Heckscher-
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disaggregation. When trading partners vary in terms of skill diversity, changes in inequality
occur within low- and high-skill workers, respectively. Similarly, North-North trade does not
yield a decrease (or increase) in the employment shares of the skill-intensive tasks; instead,
it leads to a U-shape (or inverted U-shape) relationship between tasks￿employment growth
and their skill intensity.
Section 5 presents our ￿nal class of comparative statics exercises: the implications of
global technological change and o⁄shoring in the world economy. For expositional purposes,
we restrict ourselves to the case in which trade is driven only by di⁄erences in skill abundance.
In this environment, we ￿rst show that global skill-biased technological change induces skill
downgrading in each country, a pervasive rise in inequality in each country, and an increase
in inequality between countries. In addition, we show that our framework also provides
sharp predictions regarding the implications of o⁄shoring between a Northern and a South-
ern country, modeled as the ability of Northern ￿rms to hire Southern workers using the
North￿ s superior technology. In our model, o⁄shoring acts like an increase in the size of the
Southern country, which makes the world distribution of workers less skill abundant. This,
in contrast to the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, induces skill downgrading and a pervasive
rise in inequality in both countries.2
Section 6 discusses two extensions of our basic framework. Our ￿rst extension shows
that our results can be generalized to the case of an arbitrary, but discrete, number of goods
and factors. Unlike standard neoclassical trade models, our comparative static results do not
crucially depend on whether or not there are more goods than factors; see e.g. Ethier (1984).
Though our approach admittedly is more elegant in the continuum-by-continuum case, none
of our results hinge on the dimensionality of our economy. Our second extension shows that
our results about changes in inequality over a continuum of skills can also be used to make
predictions about between-group inequality (e.g. the skilled-wage premium) and within-
group inequality (e.g. the 90 ￿ 10 log hourly wage di⁄erential among college graduates)
for observationally identical factors. In particular, we demonstrate that North-South trade
integration, when driven by factor endowment di⁄erences, leads to an increase in between-
and within-group inequality in the North, and a decrease in between- and within-group
inequality in the South.
Our paper contributes to two distinct literatures. The ￿rst one is the assignment litera-
2A related mechanism was ￿rst studied by Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and, subsequently, Zhu and Tre￿ er
(2005) in an economy with two types of workers, skilled and unskilled. We come back to the relationship
between their results and ours in Section 5.Matching and Inequality 5
ture; see Sattinger (1993) for an overview. Typical results in this ￿eld fall into two broad cat-
egories. On the one hand, authors like Becker (1973), Heckman and Honore (1990), Shimer
and Smith (2000), Legros and Newman (2002), Legros and Newman (2007), and Costinot
(Forthcoming) o⁄er general results focusing on cross-sectional predictions, such as su¢ cient
conditions for positive assortative matching to arise. On the other hand, authors like Teulings
(1995), Teulings (2005), Kremer and Maskin (2003), Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006),
Antras, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), Gabaix and Landier (2008), Tervio (2008),
and Blanchard and Willmann (2008) o⁄er speci￿c comparative statics predictions under
strong functional form restrictions on the distribution of skills, worker productivity, and/or
the pattern of substitution across goods.
To this literature, our paper o⁄ers su¢ cient conditions for robust monotone compara-
tive statics predictions￿ without functional form restrictions on the distribution of skills or
worker productivity￿ in a Roy-like assignment model where goods neither have to be perfect
substitutes nor perfect complements. These general results are useful because they deepen
our understanding of an important class of models in the labor and trade literature, clari-
fying how relative factor supply and relative factor demand a⁄ect factor prices and factor
allocations in such environments. Compared to the previous literature, the greater generality
of our theory also is useful in that it allows us to o⁄er a unifying perspective on a wide range
of phenomena, from technological change to o⁄shoring.
Our paper also contributes to the theory of international trade. There exist many neo-
classical trade models analyzing the impact of either trade integration or o⁄shoring on factor
allocations and factor prices. These models, however, generally involve either a large number
of goods and two factors: Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1980), Feenstra and Hanson
(1996), and Zhu and Tre￿ er (2005); or two goods and a large number of factors: Gross-
man and Maggi (2000) and Grossman (2004).3 While extending standard neoclassical trade
models to a large number of both goods and factors is, of course, theoretically possible, the
predictions derived in such environments, unfortunately, are weak. In a well-known paper,
Jones and Scheinkman (1977) shows, for example, that a rise in the price of some good
causes an even larger proportional increase in the price of some factor; but depending on the
number of goods and factors, it may or may not lead to an even larger proportional decrease
3A related literature to which our paper makes contact investigates the implications of trade integra-
tion on inequality in monopolistically competitive environments with heterogeneous ￿rms and labor market
imperfections, see e.g. Davis and Harrigan (2007), Amiti and Davis (2008), Helpman, Itskhoki, and Red-
ding (2008), and Sethupathy (2008); or heterogeneous workers and endogenous technology adoption, see e.g.
Yeaple (2005).Matching and Inequality 6
in the price of some other factor.
By imposing stronger assumptions on the supply-side of our economy, namely those of
a Roy-like assignment model, we derive much stronger predictions on the consequences of
globalization in economies with an arbitrarily large number of both goods and factors.4 In
addition to the sharp results that it o⁄ers, this new approach enables us to discuss, within a
uni￿ed framework, phenomena that would otherwise fall outside the scope of standard trade
theory, such as pervasive changes in inequality and wage and job polarization.
2 The Closed Economy
2.1 Basic Environment
Endowments. We consider an economy populated by a continuum of workers with skill
s 2 R. We denote by V (s) ￿ 0 the inelastic supply of workers with skill s; and by S ￿
fs 2 RjV (s) > 0g the set of skills available in the economy. Throughout this paper, we
restrict ourselves to skill distributions such that S = [s;s], though di⁄erent V ￿ s may have
di⁄erent supports.
Technology. There is one ￿nal good which we use as the numeraire. Producing the ￿nal
good requires a continuum of intermediate goods or tasks indexed by their skill intensity










where Y (￿) ￿ 0 is the endogenous output of task ￿; 0 ￿ " < 1 is the constant elasticity
of substitution across tasks; B (￿) ￿ 0 is an exogenous technological parameter; and ￿ ￿
f￿ 2 RjB (￿) > 0g corresponds to the set of tasks available in the economy. As before, we
restrict ourselves to technologies such that ￿ = [￿;￿], though di⁄erent B￿ s may have di⁄erent
supports.
4Ohnsorge and Tre￿ er (2007) and Costinot (Forthcoming) also use assignment models with many goods
and factors in a trade context, but do not derive any comparative statics predictions. In related work,
Anderson (2009) o⁄ers a neoclassical trade model with a continuum of goods and factors. In his model,
however, the allocation of the continuum of factors is exogenously given, and therefore, results are restricted
to changes in factor prices.
5Only two properties of the CES aggregator are critical for all of our results: (i) constant returns to scale;
and (ii) Gorman (1968) separability. Properties (i) and (ii), however, also imply CES, which we therefore
assume throughout.Matching and Inequality 7
Producing tasks only requires workers. Workers are perfect substitutes in the production





where L(s;￿) ￿ 0 is the endogenous number of workers with skill s performing task ￿. We





0;￿), for all s > s
0 and ￿ > ￿
0. (3)




A(s0;￿0). In other words,
high-skill workers have a comparative advantage in tasks with high-skill intensity.
Market structure. All markets are perfectly competitive with all goods being produced



















[p(￿)A(s;￿) ￿ w(s)]L(s;￿)ds, (5)
where w(s) > 0 is the wage of a worker with skill s. For technical reasons, we also assume
that B and V are continuous functions.
2.2 De￿nition of a Competitive Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium, all ￿rms maximize their pro￿ts and all markets clear. Pro￿t
maximization by ￿nal good producers requires
Y (￿) = I ￿ [p(￿)=B (￿)]





denotes total income. Since there are constant returns to
scale, pro￿t maximization by intermediate good producers requires
p(￿)A(s;￿) ￿ w(s) ￿ 0, for all s 2 S;
p(￿)A(s;￿) ￿ w(s) = 0, for all s 2 S such that L(s;￿) > 0.
(7)Matching and Inequality 8








L(s;￿)d￿, for all s 2 S. (9)
In rest of this paper, we formally de￿ne a competitive equilibrium as follows.
De￿nition 1 A competitive equilibrium is a set of functions Y : ￿ ￿! R+, L : S ￿ ￿ ￿!
R+, p : ￿ ￿! R+, w : S ￿! R+ such that Conditions (6)-(9) hold.
2.3 Properties of a Competitive Equilibrium
Given our assumptions on worker productivity, A(s;￿), pro￿t-maximization condition (7)
imposes strong restrictions on competitive equilibria.
Lemma 1 In a competitive equilibrium, there exists an increasing bijection M : S ! ￿ such
that L(s;￿) > 0 if and only if M (s) = ￿.
Lemma 1 derives from the fact that: (i) factors of production are perfect substitutes
within each task; and (ii) A is strictly log-supermodular. Perfect substitutability, on the
one hand, implies the existence of a matching function M summarizing the allocation of
workers to tasks. Because of the linearity of the task production function, if a worker of
skill s is allocated to task ￿, they all are. Log-supermodularity, on the other hand, implies
the monotonicity of this matching function. Since high-skill workers are relatively more
productive in tasks with high-skill intensity, high-￿ ￿rms are willing to bid relatively more
for these workers. In a competitive equilibrium, this induces positive assortative matching
of high-s workers to high-￿ tasks.6
The rest of our analysis crucially relies on the following lemma:





I ￿ fp[M (s)]=B [M (s)]g
￿", (10)
6Formally, the log-supermodularity of A is necessary and su¢ cient for p(￿)A(s;￿) to satisfy the single
crossing property in (s;￿) for all p(￿), and therefore, for positive assortative matching to arise for any price







with M (s) = ￿, M (s) = ￿, and p[M (s)] = w(s)=A[s;M (s)].
According to Lemma 2, the two key endogenous variables of our model, the matching
function, M, and the wage schedule, w, are given by the solution of a system of ordinary
di⁄erential equations. Equation (10) summarizes how, because of market clearing, factor
supply and factor demand determine the matching function. Equation (11) summarizes
how, because of pro￿t-maximization, the matching function determines the wage schedule.
Once w and M have been computed, Y and p can be computed by simple substitutions using
Equations (6) and (7).
3 Comparative Statics in the Closed Economy
Armed with the knowledge that a competitive equilibrium is characterized by Equations (10)
and (11), we now investigate how exogenous changes in factor supply, V , and factor demand,
B, a⁄ect factor allocation and factor prices. In each case, we ￿rst determine how exogenous
changes in V and B a⁄ect the matching function, M. We then consult Equation (11) to
draw conclusions about its implications for the wage schedule, w.
3.1 Changes in Factor Supply
3.1.1 Skill Abundance





0), for all s ￿ s
0 (12)
Property (12) corresponds to the monotone likelihood ratio property; see Milgrom (1981).7
It captures the idea that there are relatively more high-skill workers under V than under V 0.




V 0(s0). This is the natural generalization,
to a continuum of factors, of the notion of skill abundance in a two-factor model. Property
(12), in addition, allows us to consider situations where di⁄erent sets of skills are available
7There exists a close mathematical connection between log-supermodularity and the monotone likelihood
ratio property. Formally, if we let V (s) ￿ e V (s;￿) and V 0 (s) ￿ e V (s;￿0) with ￿ ￿ ￿0, then V and V 0 satis￿es
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Figure 1: Changes in skill abundance and matching
under V and V 0. If s;s0 = 2 S\S0, Property (12) implies that s 2 S and s0 2 S0, or equivalently,
that S is greater than S0 in the strong set order: s ￿ s0 and s ￿ s0. In other words, the
highest-skill workers must be in the economy characterized by V and the lowest-skill workers
in the economy characterized by V 0. Property (12) is illustrated in Figure 1 (a).
In the rest of this paper, we say that:
De￿nition 2 V is skill-abundant relative to V 0, denoted V ￿a V 0, if Property (12) holds.
We ￿rst analyze the impact of a change in skill abundance on matching. Let M and M0
be the matching functions associated with V and V 0, respectively. Our ￿rst result can be
stated as follows.
Lemma 3 Suppose V ￿a V 0. Then M (s) ￿ M0 (s) for all s 2 S \ S0.
From a worker standpoint, moving from V to V 0 implies task upgrading: each type of
worker performs a task with higher skill intensity under V 0. From a task standpoint, this
means skill downgrading: each task is performed by workers with lower skills under V 0.
This is illustrated in Figure 1 (b).8 At a broad level, the intuition behind Lemma 3 is very
simple. As the relative supply of the high-skill workers goes down, market clearing conditions
require more tasks to be performed by low-skill workers. So, the M schedule should shift
8For expositional purposes, we have chosen to state all our de￿nitions and predictions using weak inequal-
ities. It should be clear, however, that both our de￿nitions and predictions have natural, though slightly
more involved, counterparts with strict inequalities.Matching and Inequality 11
left. To derive a more precise understanding of Lemma 3, suppose that M (s) > M0 (s)
for some s 2 S \ S0. Then there must be two tasks, s1 < s2, such that M crosses M0
from below at s1 and from above at s2. By our market clearing condition, this can only
happen if: (i) the relative supply of s2 is strictly higher under V 0; and/or (ii) the relative
demand for s2 is strictly lower under V 0. On the factor supply side, Property (12) implies
V (s2)/V (s1) ￿ V 0 (s2)/V 0 (s1), which precisely precludes condition (i). On the factor
demand side, Property (3) implies p[M (s2)]=p[M (s1)] ￿ p0 [M0 (s2)]=p0 [M0 (s1)], which
precisely precludes condition (ii).
Now let us consider the associated impact of a change in skill abundance on wages. Let
w and w0 be the wage schedules associated with V and V 0, respectively, where V ￿a V 0.



















, for all s > s
0 in S \ S
0. (13)
Moving from V to V 0 leads to a pervasive rise in inequality: for any pair of workers, the
relative wage of the worker with a higher skill level￿ who is relatively less abundant under
V 0￿ goes up. In our model, a decrease in the relative supply of the high-skill workers triggers
a reallocation of all workers towards the skill intensive tasks. Since A is log-supermodular,
this increases the marginal return of the high-skill workers relatively more.
3.1.2 Skill Diversity
We now consider the case where V and V 0 satisfy:
(i) V
0 ￿a V , for all s < b s, and (ii) V ￿a V
0, for all s ￿ b s, with b s 2 S
0. (14)
Property (14) captures the idea that there are relatively more workers with extreme skill
levels (either high or low) under V than V 0. If di⁄erent sets of skills are available under V
and V 0, then Property (14) implies S0 ￿ S. Moreover, for any pair of distinct skill levels
s0 ￿ s < b s with s;s0 2 S0, there are relatively more high-skill workers in the economy
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Figure 2: Changes in skill diversity and matching




V 0(s0). Property (14) is illustrated in Figure 2 (a).
In the rest of this paper, we say that:
De￿nition 3 V is more diverse than V 0, denoted V ￿d V 0, if Property (14) holds.
De￿nition 3 is a stronger notion of diversity than in Grossman and Maggi (2000) in
the sense that we impose likelihood ratio dominance on either side of b s whereas they only
impose ￿rst-order stochastic dominance. It also is a weaker notion, however, in the sense
that Grossman and Maggi (2000) impose symmetry on V and V 0 while we do not.
As before, let M and M0 be the matching functions associated with V and V 0, respectively.
Our second result can be stated as follows.
Lemma 4 Suppose V ￿d V 0. Then there exists a skill level s￿ 2 S0 such that M (s) ￿ M0 (s)
for all s 2 [s0;s￿], and M (s) ￿ M0 (s) for all s 2 [s￿;s0].
Moving from V to V 0 implies job polarization: skill upgrading for low skill intensity tasks,
￿ < ￿￿; and skill downgrading for high skill intensity tasks, ￿￿ < ￿, where ￿￿ ￿ M (s￿) =
M0 (s￿). This is illustrated in Figure 2 (b).9
As in the case of a change in skill abundance, the basic intuition behind these two results
relies on our market clearing conditions. If V ￿d V 0, the relative supply of high-skill workers
9Note that V ￿d V 0 does not guarantee by itself that s￿ is in the interior of the support of V 0. An
example of su¢ cient conditions that guarantee s￿ 2 (s0;s0) are V ￿d V 0 and S0 ￿ S.Matching and Inequality 13
increases over the range s < s < b s. Thus, more tasks should employ these workers. The
converse is true over the range b s < s < s.
Now let us turn to the associated wage schedules, w and w0 under the restriction that
V ￿d V 0. Combining Lemma 4, Equation (11), and the log-supermodularity of A, we obtain
dlnw
ds ￿ dlnw0
ds , for all s0 < s < s￿;
dlnw
ds ￿ dlnw0
ds , for all s￿ < s < s0.








w0(s0), for all s￿ ￿ s0 < s ￿ s0.
(15)
Within each group of workers￿ low skill, s < s￿, or high skill, s > s￿￿ changes in skill
diversity amount to changes in skill-abundance. For any pair of workers whose abilities are
no greater or no less than s￿, the relative wage of the worker whose skill becomes relatively
less abundant goes up.
3.2 Changes in Factor Demand
In the previous section, we focused on exogenous changes in factor supply. We now brie￿ y
demonstrate how our concepts and techniques can be extended to analyze exogenous changes
in factor demand.
3.2.1 Skill-biased technological change





0)B (￿), for all ￿ ￿ ￿
0 (16)
Property (16) captures changes in relative factor demand which are biased towards high-skill





any pair of tasks ￿ ￿ ￿0 in ￿\￿0. In other words, a shift from B to B0 increases the relative
demand for tasks performed by high-skill workers. Property (16), in addition, allows us to
consider situations in which the technologies characterized by B and B0 use di⁄erent sets















Figure 3: Skill- and extreme-biased technological change and matching
￿0 ￿ ￿ and ￿0 ￿ ￿. Put simply, the most-skill intensive tasks must be used under B0 and
the least skill intensive tasks under B.
In the rest of this paper, we say that:
De￿nition 4 B0 is skill-biased relative to B, denoted B0 ￿s B, if Property (16) holds.
Let M and M0 denote the matching functions associated with B and B0, respectively.
The demand version of the results on changes in factor supply derived in Lemma (3) can be
stated as follows.
Lemma 5 Suppose B0 ￿s B. Then M (s) ￿ M0 (s) for all s 2 S.
Broadly speaking, if the relative demand for the skill-intensive goods rises, then market
clearing conditions require workers to move towards tasks with higher skill intensities in
order to maintain equilibrium. This implies skill downgrading at the task level, and task
upgrading at the worker level. This is illustrated in Figure 3 (a).
Finally, let w and w0 be the wage schedules associated with B and B0, respectively, where















, for all s > s
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Moving from B to B0 leads to a pervasive rise in inequality: for any pair of workers, the
relative wage of the more skilled worker increases. The mechanism linking the matching
function to the wage schedule is the same as in Section 3.1.1. By Lemma 5, an increase in
the relative demand for goods with high-skill intensities triggers a reallocation of workers
towards such tasks. Given the log-supermodularity of A, this increases the marginal return
of high-skill workers relatively more.
3.2.2 Extreme-biased technological change
Finally, we consider a shift in the B schedule, from B to B0, such that:
(i) B ￿s B
0 for all ￿ < b ￿, and (ii) B
0 ￿s B for all ￿ ￿ b ￿, with b ￿ 2 ￿. (18)
A shift from B to B0 increases the relative demand for tasks with low skill intensities over the
range ￿ < b ￿, and increases the relative demand for tasks with high-skill intensities over the
range ￿ ￿ b ￿. Property (18) is reminiscent, for instance, of the impact of computerization,
as modeled by Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006). As in our previous comparative statics
exercise, the change in relative factor demand captured by Property (18) may result, among
other things, from the introduction of a new set of tasks in the economy, i.e. ￿ ￿ ￿0.
In the rest of this paper, we say that:
De￿nition 5 B0 is extreme-biased relative to B, denoted B0 ￿e B, if Property (18) holds.
Let M and M0 denote the matching functions associated with B and B0, respectively.
The demand version of the results on changes in factor supply derived in Lemma 4 can be
stated as follows.
Lemma 6 Suppose B0 ￿e B. Then there exists a skill level s￿ 2 S such that M (s) ￿ M0 (s)
for all s 2 [s;s￿], and M (s) ￿ M0 (s) for all s 2 [s￿;s].
Moving from B to B0 induces workers to reallocate out of intermediate ￿ tasks and
towards extreme ￿ tasks. We refer to this reallocation as job polarization. This is illustrated
in Figure 3(b). As in the case of diversity, relative wages are given by Equation (15). Hence,
extreme-biased technological change implies wage polarization as well.Matching and Inequality 16
4 The World Economy
In the remainder of this paper we consider a world economy comprising two countries, Home
(H) and Foreign (F). Workers are internationally immobile, the unique ￿nal good is not
traded, and all intermediate goods are freely traded.10 In each country, we assume that
production is as described in Section 2.1 and that factor productivity di⁄erences across
countries are Hicks-neutral Ai (s;￿) ￿ ￿iA(s;￿) for i = H;F, with ￿i > 0. Hence, cross-
country di⁄erences in factor endowments, VH and VF, and technological biases, BH and BF,
are the only rationale for trade.11 Throughout this section, we denote by SW ￿ SH [SF and
￿W ￿ ￿H [ ￿F the set of skills and tasks available in the world economy, respectively.
4.1 Free Trade Equilibrium
Before analyzing the consequences of globalization, we characterize a free trade equilibrium.
Given our work in Section 2.2, this is a straightforward exercise. A competitive equilibrium
in the world economy under free trade is a set of functions (YH;LH;wH;YF;LF;wF;p) such
that Conditions (6), (7), and (9) hold in both countries, and good markets clear
YH (￿) + YF (￿) =
Z
s2SW
[AH (s;￿)LH (s;￿) + AF (s;￿)LF (s;￿)]ds, for all ￿ 2 ￿W.
Since technological di⁄erences at the task level are Hicks-neutral, our model is isomorphic
to a model in which tasks are produced using the same technology around the world, but
countries￿factor supply are given by e Vi ￿ ￿iVi. Moreover, since factors of production are
perfect substitutes within each task, factor price equalization necessarily holds in e¢ ciency
units; see Condition (7). Therefore we can focus on the free trade equilibrium that replicates
the integrated equilibrium.
Let MT, wT, and pT denote the matching function, the wage expressed in Home units,





IW ￿ fpT [MT (s)]=BW [MT (s)]g
￿",
10We brie￿ y discuss the case in which the ￿nal good is freely traded at the end of subsection 4.2.
11It should be clear that di⁄erences in technological biases are not Ricardian technological di⁄erences. In
our model, di⁄erences in technological biases play very much the same role as di⁄erences in preferences in a







where M (sW) = ￿W and M (sW) = ￿W are the boundary conditions for the match-
ing function; pT [MT (s)] = wT (s)=￿HA[s;MT (s)] is the price schedule; BW [MT (s)] ￿
f(IH=IW)BH [MT (s)]
" + (IF=IW)BF [MT (s)]
"g
1=" characterizes the skill bias of the ￿world￿ s
technology￿ ; and IW ￿
R
s2SW wT (s)[VH (s) + (￿F=￿H)VH (s)]ds is world income.
4.2 Consequences of North-South Trade
We conceptualize North-South trade as situations where countries di⁄er in either: (i) their
skill abundance, VH ￿a VF; or (ii) the skill bias of their technologies, BH ￿s BF.
4.2.1 The Role of Cross-Country Di⁄erences in Factor Endowments
To isolate the role of factor supply considerations, we ￿rst assume that Home is skill abundant
relative to Foreign, VH ￿a VF, but that the ￿nal good is produced using the same technology
around the world, BH = BF. In a two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin model, when the skill-
abundant country opens up to trade: (i) the skill intensity of both tasks decreases; (ii)
the skill-intensive task expands; and (iii) the skill premium goes up. Conversely, when the
unskill-abundant country opens up to trade: (i) the skill intensity of both tasks increases;
(ii) the unskill-intensive task expands; and (iii) the skill premium goes down. We now o⁄er
continuum-by-continuum extensions of these classic results.12 Our analysis builds on the
following Lemma.
Lemma 7 Suppose VH ￿a VF. Then VW ￿ ￿HVH + ￿FVF satis￿es VH ￿a VW ￿a VF.
As in the two-factor model, if Home is skill-abundant relative to Foreign, then Home is
skill-abundant relative to the World and the World is skill-abundant relative to Foreign.
We ￿rst consider the implications of trade integration on the matching of workers to
tasks. Let MH and MF be the matching functions at Home and Abroad, respectively, under




H (￿) ￿ M
￿1
T (￿) ￿ M
￿1
F (￿) for all ￿ 2 ￿W: (19)
12We omit the continuous analogue to the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem because both Ohnsorge and Tre￿ er
(2007) and Costinot (Forthcoming) prove this result with arbitrarily many factors and tasks.Matching and Inequality 18
This is the counterpart to E⁄ect (i) in the two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin model. A direct
corollary of Inequality (19) is that for any ￿ 2 ￿W:
R sH
M￿1
T (￿) VH (s)ds ￿
R sH
M￿1
H (￿) VH (s)ds;
R M￿1
T (￿)





According to Inequality (20), the employment share in tasks with high-skill intensities, from
￿ to ￿W, increases at Home, whereas the employment share in tasks with low skill intensities,
from ￿W to ￿, increases Abroad. This is the counterpart to E⁄ect (ii) in the two-by-two
Heckscher-Ohlin model.
We now turn to the implications of trade integration on inequality. Let wH and wF be the
wage schedules at Home and Abroad, respectively, in autarky. As in Section 3.1.1, Inequality
(19) and the log-supermodularity of A imply a pervasive rise in inequality in Home and a








wF(s0), for all s 2 SF.
(21)
Inequality (21) is the counterpart to E⁄ect (iii). It captures a strong Stolper-Samuelson
e⁄ect: anywhere in the skill distribution, workers with higher skills get relatively richer in
the skill-abundant country under free trade, whereas they get relatively poorer in the other
country.
To get a better sense of this e⁄ect, denote by IA
i (q) ￿
R si
sq wi (s)Vi (s)ds and IT
i (q) ￿
R si
sq wT (s)(￿i=￿H)Vi (s)ds the total earnings of the top (q ￿ 100)% of the skill distribution












In other words, changes in inequality are fractal in nature: within any truncation of the skill












In spite of the large number of goods and factors in this economy, the fundamental forces link-
ing trade integration and inequality remain simple. Because of changes in the relative supplyMatching and Inequality 19
of skills, trade integration induces skill downgrading in the skill-abundant country. Thus,
workers move into tasks with higher skill intensities, which increases the marginal return to
skill, and in turn, inequality. Proposition 1 summarizes our results on the consequences of
North-South trade when driven by factor-endowment di⁄erences.
Proposition 1 If Home is skill-abundant relative to Foreign, then, all else equal, trade inte-
gration induces: (i) skill downgrading at Home and Skill upgrading Abroad; (ii) an increase
in the employment share of tasks with high-skill intensities at Home and low-skill intensities
Abroad; and (iii) a pervasive rise in inequality at Home and a pervasive fall in inequality
Abroad.
The simple two-by-two Stolper-Samuelson e⁄ect, which Proposition 1 (iii) extends to
the continuum-by-continuum case, is one of the most tested implications of trade theory.
Empirical results, however, are mixed. Finding either direct or indirect support are, for
example, O￿ Rourke and Williamson (1999), Wei and Wu (2001), Menezes-Filho and Muendler
(2007), Broda and Romalis (2008), and Michaels (2008); for an extensive list of papers
￿nding violations, see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007). Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) provide
the following summary of the state of this empirical literature: ￿Overall, it appears that
the particular mechanisms through which globalization a⁄ected inequality are country, time,
and case speci￿c; that the e⁄ects of trade liberalization need to be examined in conjunction
with other concurrent policy reforms...￿Seen through the lens of our theory, the previous
empirical results can be interpreted as follows. For a given country￿ s globalization experience,
cross-country di⁄erences in relative factor supply may or may not be the main determinant
of changes in inequality. With this in mind, we now turn to the implications of cross-country
di⁄erences in relative factor demand.
4.2.2 The Role of Cross-Country Di⁄erences in Technological Biases
To isolate the role of factor demand considerations, we now assume that countries di⁄er in
terms of their ￿nal good production functions, BH ￿s BF, but have identical factor supply,
VH = VF. Like in the case of di⁄erences in factor supply, our analysis builds on the following
Lemma.
Lemma 8 Suppose BH ￿s BF. Then BW satis￿es BH ￿s BW ￿s BF.
If Home￿ s technology is skill biased relative to Foreign￿ s, then Home￿ s technology is skill
biased relative to the World￿ s and the World￿ s technology is skill biased relative to Foreign￿ s.Matching and Inequality 20
We ￿rst consider the impact of trade integration on the matching of workers to tasks. Let
MH and MF be the matching functions at Home and Abroad, respectively, under autarky.
By Lemmas 5 and 8, trade integration induces skill upgrading at Home and skill downgrading
Abroad:
MH (s) ￿ MT (s) ￿ MF (s), for all s 2 SW. (22)
Note that if Home and Foreign use di⁄erent sets of tasks under autarky, ￿H 6= ￿F, then
trade integration induces workers to move into the production of new tasks. In the Foreign
country, the most skilled workers become employed in tasks whose skill intensity is higher
than the intensity of any tasks performed under autarky. The converse is true in the Home
country, where the least skilled workers become employed in tasks whose skill intensity is
lower than the intensity of any tasks performed under autarky.
What happens to the distribution of wages? As in Section 3.2, Inequality (22) and the










, for all s > s
0. (23)
To sum up, the consequences of North-South trade driven by demand considerations are the
exact opposite of the consequences of North-South trade driven by supply considerations.
Proposition 2 If Home￿ s technology is skill-biased relative to Foreign￿ s, then, all else equal,
trade integration induces: (i) skill upgrading at Home and Skill downgrading Abroad; (ii) an
increase in the employment share of tasks with low-skill intensities at Home and high-skill
intensities Abroad; and (iii) a pervasive fall in inequality at Home and a pervasive rise in
inequality Abroad.
Propositions 1 and 2 together imply that predictions regarding the impact of globalization
crucially depend on the correlation between supply and demand considerations. In a series
of in￿ uential papers, see e.g. Acemoglu (1998) and Acemoglu (2003), Acemoglu argues
that skill-abundant countries tend to use skill-biased technologies. Using our notation, this
means that if VH ￿a VF, then BH ￿s BF. Combining the insights of Propositions 1 and
2, we should therefore not be surprised if: (i) similar countries have di⁄erent globalization
experiences depending on which of these two forces, supply or demand, dominates; and (ii)
13Verhoogen (2008) provides a partial equilibrium framework yielding similar predictions, at the ￿rm level,
and empirically ￿nds supportive evidence in Mexico.Matching and Inequality 21
the overall e⁄ect of trade liberalization on factor allocation and factor prices tends to be
small in practice.
Finally, note that if the ￿nal good is freely traded as well, then the consequences of North-
South trade integration also depend on whether Home￿ s or Foreign￿ s technology is more
e¢ cient. If, for instance, Home￿ s technology is more e¢ cient for all tasks, BH (￿) > BH (￿)
for all ￿, then North-South trade integration is more likely to increase inequality in both
countries.
4.3 Consequences of North-North Trade
To avoid a taxonomic exercise, we focus on the case in which countries only di⁄er in factor
supply and conceptualize North-North trade as a situation where Home is more diverse than
Foreign, VH ￿d VF. Under this assumption, we demonstrate that the familiar mechanisms
at work in North-South trade apply equally well to North-North trade, which allows us, in
turn, to generate new results on the consequences of international trade.
Our analysis of North-North trade builds on the following Lemma.
Lemma 9 Suppose VH ￿d VF. Then VW ￿ ￿HVH + ￿FVF satis￿es VH ￿d VW ￿d VF.
Consider the Foreign country. By Lemmas 4 and 9, trade integration induces task up-
grading for low-skill workers and task downgrading for high-skill workers. Formally, there
exists s￿
F 2 [sF;sF] such that
MF (s) ￿ MT (s), for all s 2 [sF;s￿
F];
MF (s) ￿ MT (s), for all s 2 [s￿
F;sF].
(24)
This means skill downgrading for low skill intensity tasks and skill upgrading for high-skill
intensity tasks.
The converse is true in the Home country. Namely, there exists s￿
H 2 [sH;sH] such that
MH (s) > MT (s), for all s 2 [sH;s￿
H];
MH (s) < MT (s), for all s 2 [s￿
H;sH].
(25)
The di⁄erential impact of North-North trade integration on the tasks performed by high-
and low-skill workers has stark implications on inequality in the two countries. At Home,Matching and Inequality 22













wH(s0), for all sH ￿ s0 < s0 ￿ sH.
(26)
Moving from autarky to free trade leads to a polarization of the wage distribution in the
more diverse country. Among the least skilled workers, those with lower skills get relatively
richer, whereas the converse is true among the most skilled workers. Similarly, in the less













wF(s0), for all s￿
F ￿ s0 < s0 ￿ sF.
(27)
Inequality (27) implies convergence Abroad, as the ￿middle-class￿bene￿ts relatively more
from free trade. Proposition 3 summarizes our results on the consequences of North-North
trade.
Proposition 3 If Home is more diverse than Foreign, then, all else equal, trade integration
induces (i) skill upgrading in tasks with low-skill intensities at Home and high-skill intensi-
ties Abroad; (ii) skill downgrading in tasks with high-skill intensities at Home and low-skill
intensities Abroad; and (iii) wage polarization at Home and convergence Abroad.
It is worth emphasizing that, unlike Propositions 1 and 2, Proposition 3 has no clear
implications for the overall level of inequality. Under North-North trade, the relative wage
between high- and low-skill workers￿ as well as the relative price of the goods they produce￿
may either increase or decrease. The consequences of North-North trade are to be found at a
higher level of disaggregation. When trading partners vary in terms of skill diversity, changes
in inequality occur within low- and high-skill workers, respectively. Similarly, Proposition
3 does not predict a decrease (or increase) in the employment shares of the skill-intensive
tasks. According to our theory, North-North trade leads to a U-shape (or inverted U-shape)
relationship between tasks￿employment growth and their skill-intensity.14
14While we have focused on the consequences of trade integration, our analysis also has natural implications
for immigration. Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), for example, document intermediate selection of Mexican
migrants into the United States. Within our theoretical framework, such a phenomenon could be interpreted
as a change in the Mexican distribution of skills in terms of diversity. Using the same logic as in Proposition
3, our model would then predict that immigration should lead to wage convergence in Mexico.Matching and Inequality 23
5 Technological Change in the World Economy
In this section we consider the impact of technological di⁄usion and skill-biased technological
change in the world economy. For expositional purposes, we restrict ourselves to the North-
South case where VH ￿a VF, and assume that ￿H ￿ ￿F. In other words, the skill-abundant
country also is (weakly) more productive in all tasks.
5.1 Global Skill-Biased Technological Change
We ￿rst analyze the impact of global skill-biased technological change (SBTC), modelled
as a shift from BW to B0
W such that B0
W ￿s BW. We denote MT and M0
T the matching
functions in the integrated equilibrium under BW and B0
W, respectively, and wT and w0
T the
associated wage schedules. From our previous work in a closed economy, we already know
that global SBTC induces skill downgrading/task upgrading in both countries:
MT (s) ￿ M
0
T (s), for all s 2 SW.








, for all s > s
0.
which leads to a pervasive rise in inequality within each country. Compared to a closed







T (s)(￿i=￿H)Vi (s)ds denote total income in country i = H;F. Our
predictions about the impact of global SBTC on cross-country inequality can be stated as
follows.
Lemma 10 Suppose VH ￿a VF and B0




According to Lemma 10, an increase in the relative labor demand for skill-intensive tasks
worldwide increases inequality between Home and Foreign. The formal argument relies on
the fact that log-supermodularity is preserved by multiplication and integration, but the
basic intuition is simple: high-skill agents gain relatively more from such a change, and
Home has relatively more of them. In our model, within- and between-country inequality
tend to go hand in hand: ceteris paribus, changes in matching that increase inequality inMatching and Inequality 24
both countries also increase inequality across countries. Proposition 4 summarizes our results
on the consequences of global SBTC.
Proposition 4 Global SBTC induces: (i) skill downgrading in each country; (ii) a pervasive
rise in inequality in each country; and (iii) an increase in inequality between countries.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that Proposition 4 also has interesting implications for
the consequences of trade liberalization when our CES aggregator is reinterpreted as a utility
function. Suppose, for example, that a country￿ s preferences are a function of their aggregate
income I, and that wealthier countries have a relative preference for skill-intensive goods:
BI ￿s BI0 for all I > I0. Then, by increasing income in all countries, trade liberalization
would lead to a pervasive rise in inequality around the world.
5.2 O⁄shoring tasks
For our ￿nal comparative statics exercise, we analyze the impact of an increase in Foreign
workers￿productivities from ￿FA(s;￿) to ￿0
FA(s;￿), where ￿0
F > ￿F. A natural way to
think about such a technological change is o⁄shoring, i.e. the ability of Domestic ￿rms to
hire Foreign workers using Home￿ s superior technology.15 This is the interpretation we adopt
in the rest of this subsection.
Our analysis of task o⁄shoring builds on two simple observations. First, as far as the
integrated equilibrium is concerned, increasing the productivity of all Foreign workers from
￿F to ￿0
F > ￿F is similar to increasing their supply by ￿0
F=￿F. Second, since Foreign is
relatively unskill-abundant, an increase in e⁄ective units of Foreign factor supply, from ￿FVF
to ￿0
FVF, makes the World relatively less skill abundant, as we show in the following Lemma.
Lemma 11 Suppose VH ￿a VF and ￿0
F > ￿F. Then VW ￿ ￿HVH + ￿FVF and V 0
W ￿
￿HVH + ￿0
FVF satisfy VW ￿a V 0
W.
To sum up, if domestic ￿rms o⁄shore their production, it is as if the World distribution




T (s) ￿ MT (s) for all s 2 SW.
where MT and M0
T are the matching functions in the integrated equilibrium before and after
o⁄shoring, respectively. By Lemmas 3 and 11, o⁄shoring induces task upgrading, as the
15This way of modelling o⁄shoring is in the spirit of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).Matching and Inequality 25
World￿ s matching function moves closer towards Foreign￿ s matching function under autarky.








, for all s > s
0.
For any pair of workers in either country, the relative wage of the more skilled worker in-
creases as a result of o⁄shoring. In the integrated equilibrium, o⁄shoring is similar to an
increase in the relative size of the Foreign country. As Foreign grows relative to Home,
World prices converge to those that hold in Foreign under autarky. Since the wage sched-
ule is steeper Abroad than at Home under autarky, o⁄shoring increases inequality in both
countries. Proposition 5 summarizes our results on the consequences of o⁄shoring.
Proposition 5 O⁄shoring in the world economy induces: (i) skill downgrading in both coun-
tries; and (ii) a pervasive rise in inequality in both countries.
The previous results are reminiscent of those in Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and, subse-
quently, Zhu and Tre￿ er (2005). In addition to the fact that they apply to the full distribution
of earnings rather than just the skill premium, these results also demonstrate that neither Ri-
cardian technological di⁄erences nor a lack of factor-price equalization are necessary to yield
these predictions. The key mechanism simply is that o⁄shoring leads to sector upgrading
around the world, thereby increasing the marginal return to skill in all countries.
6 Robustness and Extensions
6.1 Number of Goods and Factors
The results derived so far all relied on the assumption that there was a continuum of tasks
and a continuum of workers. In neoclassical trade theory, comparative statics predictions on
factor allocations and prices typically are very sensitive to assumptions made on the number
of goods and factors. The objective of this section is to demonstrate that, by contrast, our
results generalize to the case of an arbitrary, but discrete, number of goods and factors. In
order to avoid a taxonomic exercise, we focus on a move from V to V 0 ￿a V in the closed
economy.
Throughout this section, we assume that there are a discrete number of factors indexed
j = 1;::::;M such that s1 < ::: < sM, and a discrete number of sectors indexed by k = 1;:::;NMatching and Inequality 26
such that ￿1 < ::: < ￿N. The rest of our model is unchanged. In terms of notation, we
let ￿(s) ￿ f￿ 2 ￿jL(s;￿) > 0g denote the set of tasks employing workers with skills s and
S (￿) ￿ fs 2 SjL(s;￿) > 0g denote the set of skills employed in task ￿, where L(s;￿) is the
allocation of workers to tasks in a competitive equilibrium. We use similar notation for the
assignment functions under V 0.
In this environment, we can derive the following counterparts to Lemmas (1) and (3).
Lemma 1 (Discrete) In a competitive equilibrium, S (￿) ￿ S (￿0) in the strong set order
for any ￿ ￿ ￿0.
Lemma 3 (Discrete) Suppose V ￿a V 0. Then ￿(s) ￿ ￿0 (s) in the strong set order for all
s 2 S \ S0.




w0(s0), for all s ￿ s0 in
S \ S0. In other words, a move from V to V 0 ￿a V leads to a pervasive rise in inequality, as
previously shown in the continuum-by-continuum case. The formal proofs can be found in
the Appendix.
6.2 Observable versus Unobservable Skills
Although our theory assumes a continuum of skills, an econometrician is unlikely to observe a
continuum of skills in practice. To bring our theory one step closer to data, we now introduce
explicitly the distinction between observable and unobservable skills.16 The objective of this
section is to demonstrate how, under reasonable assumptions, our results about changes
inequality over a continuum of unobservable skills can easily be mapped into observable
measures of inequality such as: (i) between-group inequality (e.g. the skilled-wage premium);
and (ii) within-group inequality (e.g. the 90￿10 log hourly wage di⁄erential among college
graduates). For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to the case of North-South trade integration
with factor endowment di⁄erences: VH ￿a VF and BH = BF
Throughout this section, we assume that workers are partitioned into n groups based on
some socioeconomic characteristic e1 < ::: < en, such as years of education or experience.
While ￿rms and workers perfectly observe s, we assume that the econometrician only observes
e, but knows the inelastic supply of workers with skill s in group e in country i: Vi(s;e) ￿ 0.
16Of course, the analysis of this section has similar implications in the case where the econometrician only
observes a coarse measure of task skill intensity, such as ￿Occupation￿or ￿Sector￿of employment.Matching and Inequality 27
In particular, the econometrician knows that Vi (s;e) is log-supermodular:
Vi (s;e)Vi (s
0;e
0) ￿ Vi (s;e
0)Vi (s
0;e), for all s ￿ s
0 and e ￿ e
0. (28)
Property (28) captures the idea that, in both countries, high-skill workers are relatively more
likely in groups with high levels of education or experience.
Armed with a link between observable and unobservable skills, we may now discuss
between- and within-group inequality. For any pair of groups e and e0 in country i, we de￿ne
between-group inequality as the relative average wage between two groups wi (e)=wi (e0) =
R
s2Si wi (s)Vi (s;e)ds
.R
s2Si wi (s)Vi (s;e0)ds. For any group e in country i, we de￿ne within-
group inequality as wi [s90 (e)]=wi [s10 (e)], where sq (e) denotes the skill of the worker at the
qth percentile of the wage distribution in education group e.
With the previous notation in hand, we are ready to state the implications of North-
South trade integration for between-group and within-group inequality. If VH ￿a VF and














wF[s10(e)] for all e.
(29)
Inequality (29) states that North-South trade integration, when driven by factor endowment
di⁄erences, leads to an increase in between- and within-group inequality at Home, and a
decrease in between- and within-group inequality Abroad. Like in Section 4.2.2, North-
South trade integration, when driven by technological di⁄erences, would lead the exact
opposite results. Proposition 6 summarizes the implications of North-South trade driven by
factor-endowment di⁄erences on between-group and within-group inequality.
Proposition 6 If Home is skill-abundant relative to Foreign, then, all else equal, trade inte-
gration induces an increase in between- and within-group inequality at Home and a decrease
in between- and within-group inequality Abroad.
7 Concluding Remarks
In the assignment literature, comparative statics predictions typically are derived under
strong functional form restrictions on the distribution of skills, worker productivity, and/or
the pattern of substitution across goods. The ￿rst contribution of our paper is to o⁄er suf-
￿cient conditions for robust monotone comparative statics predictions￿ without functionalMatching and Inequality 28
form restrictions on the distribution of skills or worker productivity￿ in a Roy-like assign-
ment model where goods neither have to be perfect substitutes nor perfect complements.
These general results are useful because they deepen our understanding of an important
class of models in the labor and trade literatures, clarifying how relative factor supply and
relative factor demand a⁄ect factor prices and factor allocations in such environments.
The second contribution of our paper is to show how these general results can be used
to derive sharp predictions about the consequences of globalization in economies with an
arbitrarily large number of both goods and factors. This new approach enables us to discuss,
within a uni￿ed framework, phenomena that have been recently documented in the labor
and public ￿nance literatures, but would otherwise fall outside the scope of standard trade
theory, such as pervasive changes in inequality and wage and job polarization.17
Finally, while we have emphasized the consequences of globalization, we believe that our
general results also have useful applications outside of international trade. As Heckman and
Honore (1990) note, ￿The analysis of choice of geographical location [...], schooling levels [...],
occupational choice with endogenous speci￿c human capital [...], choice of industrial sectors
[...], and the consequences of these choices for earnings inequality all fall within the general
framework of the Roy model.￿Accordingly, our tools and techniques can also potentially
shed light on each of these choices and their consequences for inequality.
17Of course, whether or not globalization actually caused such changes is an empirical matter. But to
assess empirically whether or not this is the case, we ￿rst need a trade model that can ￿speak￿to these
phenomena, which our paper provides.Matching and Inequality 29
A Proofs (I): The Closed Economy
Proof of Lemma 1. Throughout the proof, we denote S (￿) ￿ fs 2 S j L(s;￿) > 0g and
￿(s) ￿ f￿ 2 ￿ j L(s;￿) > 0g. Clearly s 2 S (￿) if and only if ￿ 2 ￿(s). We proceed in 5
steps.
Step 1: S (￿) 6= ; for all ￿ 2 ￿ and ￿(s) 6= ; for all s 2 S.
S (￿) 6= ; derives from Conditions (6) and (8). ￿(s) 6= ; derives from Condition (9).
Step 2: S (￿) and ￿(￿) are weakly increasing in the strong set order.
We ￿rst show that S (￿) is weakly increasing in the strong set order by contradiction.
Suppose there are a pair of tasks ￿0 < ￿1 and a pair of workers s0 < s1 such that s0 2 S (￿1)
and s1 2 S(￿0). Condition (7) implies
p(￿1)A(s0;￿1) ￿ w(s0) = 0; (30)
p(￿0)A(s1;￿0) ￿ w(s1) = 0; (31)
p(￿0)A(s0;￿0) ￿ w(s0) ￿ 0; (32)
p(￿1)A(s1;￿1) ￿ w(s1) ￿ 0. (33)
By Equation (30) and Inequality (32), we have
p(￿0)A(s0;￿0) ￿ p(￿1)A(s0;￿1). (34)
By Equations (31) and Inequality (33), we have
p(￿1)A(s1;￿1) ￿ p(￿0)A(s1;￿0). (35)
Combining Inequalities (34) and (35), we obtain
A(s0;￿0)A(s1;￿1) ￿ A(s0;￿1)A(s1;￿0),
which contradicts A(s;￿) strictly log-supermodular. Hence, S (￿) is weakly increasing in the
strong set order. Since s 2 S (￿) if and only if ￿ 2 ￿(s), ￿(￿) must be weakly increasing in
the strong set order as well.
Step 3: S (￿) is a singleton for all but a countable set of ￿.
Let ￿0 be the subset of tasks ￿ such that ￿[S (￿)] > 0, where ￿ is the Lebesgue measureMatching and Inequality 30
over R. We ￿rst show that ￿0 is a countable set. Choose an arbitrary ￿ 2 ￿0 and let s(￿) ￿
inf S (￿) and s(￿) ￿ supS (￿). The fact that ￿[S (￿)] > 0 has strictly positive measure yields
s(￿) < s(￿). Because S (￿) is weakly increasing in ￿, we must have
P
￿2￿0
[s(￿0) ￿ s(￿0)] ￿
s ￿ s. So for any ￿ 2 ￿0, there must be j 2 N such that s(￿) ￿ s(￿) ￿ (s ￿ s)=j; and for
any j 2 N, there must be at most j points f￿g in ￿0 for which s(￿) ￿ s(￿) ￿ [s ￿ s]=j.
Since the union of countable sets is countable, the two previous observations imply that ￿0
is a countable set. Now take ￿ = 2 ￿0. To show that S (￿) is a singleton, we proceed by
contradiction. If S (￿) is not a singleton, then there are s < s00 such that s;s00 2 S (￿). Using
Step 1 and the fact that ￿[S (￿)] = 0, there also is s < s0 < s00 such that s0 2 S (￿0) with
￿0 6= ￿, which contradicts Step 2.
Step 4: ￿(s) is a singleton for all but a countable set of s.
Since ￿(s) 6= ; and ￿(￿) is weakly increasing in the strong set order, this follows from
the same argument as in Step 3.
Step 5: S (￿) is a singleton for all ￿.
To obtain a contradiction, suppose that there exists ￿ 2 ￿ for which S (￿) is not a
singleton. By the same argument as in Step 3, we must have ￿[S (￿)] > 0. By Step 4,
￿(s) = f￿g for ￿-almost all s 2 S (￿). Hence, Condition (9) implies
L(s;￿) = V (s)￿
￿
1 ￿ 1 IS(￿)
￿
, for ￿-almost all s 2 S (￿). (36)
where ￿ is a Dirac delta function. By Step 3 and Condition (9), we must also have ￿0 2 ￿
for which S (￿0) = fs0g with s0 2 S such that
L(s
0;￿
0) ￿ V (s
0)￿
￿
1 ￿ 1 IS(￿0)
￿
(37)
Combining Equations (36) and (37) with Conditions (6) and (8), we obtain
p(￿0)
p(￿) = 0. By




A(s0;￿0) > 0. A contradiction.
Steps 2 and 5 imply the existence of a strictly increasing function M : S ! ￿ such that
L(s;￿) > 0 if and only if M (s) = ￿. Step 1 requires M (s) = ￿ and M (s) = ￿. QED.
Proof of Lemma 2. We ￿rst consider Equation (11). Condition (7) and Lemma 1 imply
p[M (s)]A[s;M (s)] ￿ w(s) ￿ p[M (s)]A[s + ds;M (s)] ￿ w(s + ds),
p[M (s + ds)]A[s + ds;M (s + ds)] ￿ w(s + ds) ￿ p[M (s + ds)]A[s;M (s + ds)] ￿ w(s).Matching and Inequality 31
Combining the two previous inequalities
p[M (s)]fA[s + ds;M (s)] ￿ A[s;M (s)]g
ds
￿
w(s + ds) ￿ w(s)
ds
￿
p[M (s + ds)]fA[s + ds;M (s + ds)] ￿ A[s;M (s + ds)]g
ds
.
Factor market clearing conditions, Equation (9), require w to be continuous. Since p(￿) =
w[M￿1 (￿)]=A[M￿1 (￿);￿], by Condition (7) and Lemma 1, and M￿1 is continuous, by
Lemma 1, p is continuous as well. Taking the limit of the previous chain of inequalities as
ds goes to zero, we therefore get
ws (s) = p[M (s)]As [s;M (s)]. (38)







This completes the ￿rst part of our proof. We now turn to Equation (10). Lemma 1 and
Condition (9) imply that, for all s 2 S,
L(s;￿) = V (s)￿ [￿ ￿ M (s)], (39)
where ￿ is a Dirac delta function. Now consider Condition (8). At ￿ = M (s), we have







Using Equation (39), we can rearrange the previous expression as





0)￿ [M (s) ￿ M (s
0)]ds
0.
Now set ￿0 = M (s0). Since M is a bijection from S to ￿, we have
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Combining Equations (40) and (6), we obtain Equation (10). This completes the second part
of our proof. M (s) = ￿ and M (s) = ￿ derive from the fact M is an increasing bijection
from S onto ￿, whereas p[M (s)] = w(s)=A[s;M (s)] derive from Condition (7) and Lemma
1, as previously mentioned. QED.
Proof of Lemma 3. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exists s 2 S \ S0
at which M (s) > M0 (s). Since V ￿a V 0, we know that S \ S0 = [s;s0]. By Lemma 1,
we also know that M and M0 are continuous functions such that M (s) = ￿ ￿ M0 (s) and
M0 (s0) = ￿ ￿ M (s0). So, there must exist s ￿ s1 < s2 ￿ s0 and ￿ ￿ ￿1 < ￿2 ￿ ￿ such
that: (i) M0 (s1) = M (s1) = ￿1 and M0 (s2) = M (s2) = ￿2; (ii) M0
s (s1) < Ms (s1) and
M0





s (s2) < Ms (s1)/Ms (s2). (41)






































w(s1). The former inequality cannot
hold because V ￿a V 0, whereas the latter cannot hold because of Equation (11), the log-
supermodularity of A, and condition (iii). QED.
Proof of Lemma 4. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there does not exist
s￿ 2 S \ S0 such that M (s) ￿ M0 (s), for all s 2 [s0;s￿], and M (s) ￿ M0 (s), for all
s 2 [s￿;s0]. Since V ￿d V 0, we know that S\S0 = [s0;s0]. By Lemma 1, we also know that M
and M0 are continuous functions such that M0 (s0) = ￿ ￿ M (s0) and M0 (s0) = ￿ ￿ M (s0).
So, there must exist s0 ￿ s0 < s1 < s2 ￿ s0 and ￿ ￿ ￿0 < ￿1 < ￿2 ￿ ￿ such that:
(i) M0 (s0) = M (s0) = ￿0, M0 (s1) = M (s1) = ￿1, and M0 (s2) = M (s2) = ￿2; (ii)Matching and Inequality 33
Ms (s0) < M0
s (s0), Ms (s1) > M0
s (s1), and Ms (s2) < M0
s (s2); and (iii) M (s) < M0 (s) for
all s 2 (s0;s1) and M (s) > M0 (s) for all s 2 (s1;s2). At this point, there are two possible
cases: s1 < b s and s1 ￿ b s. If s1 < b s, we can follow the same steps as in the proof of Lemma
3 using s0 and s1. Formally, condition (ii) implies





























w0(s0). The former inequality cannot
hold because V 0 ￿a V for all s < b s, whereas the latter cannot hold because of Equation
(11), the log-supermodularity of A, and condition (iii). This completes our proof in the case
s1 < b s. If s1 ￿ b s, we can again follow the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 3, but using
s1 and s2. The formal argument is identical and omitted. QED.
Proof of Lemma 5. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exists s 2 [s;s]
at which M (s) > M0 (s). Since B0 ￿s B, we know that ￿ ￿ ￿0 and ￿ ￿ ￿0. By Lemma 1,
we also know that M and M0 are continuous functions such that M (s) = ￿ ￿ ￿0 = M0 (s)
and M (s) = ￿ ￿ ￿0 = M0 (s). So, there must exist s ￿ s1 < s2 ￿ s and ￿0 ￿ ￿1 < ￿2 ￿ ￿
such that: (i) M0 (s1) = M (s1) = ￿1 and M0 (s2) = M (s2) = ￿2; (ii) M0
s (s1) < Ms (s1) and
M0





s (s2) < Ms (s1)/Ms (s2). (45)






























w(s2). The former inequality cannotMatching and Inequality 34
hold because B0 ￿s B, whereas the latter cannot hold because of Equation (11), the log-
supermodularity of A, and condition (iii). QED.
Proof of Lemma 6. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there does not exist
s￿ 2 S such that M (s) ￿ M0 (s), for all s 2 [s;s￿], and M (s) ￿ M0 (s), for all s 2 [s￿;s].
Since B0 ￿e B, we know that ￿0 ￿ ￿ and ￿ ￿ ￿0. By Lemma 1, we also know that M and M0
are continuous functions such that M0 (s) = ￿0 ￿ ￿ = M (s) and M (s) = ￿ ￿ ￿0 = M0 (s).
So, there must exist s ￿ s0 < s1 < s2 ￿ s and ￿ ￿ ￿0 < ￿1 < ￿2 ￿ ￿ such that:
(i) M0 (s0) = M (s0) = ￿0, M0 (s1) = M (s1) = ￿1, and M0 (s2) = M (s2) = ￿2; (ii)
Ms (s0) < M0
s (s0), Ms (s1) > M0
s (s1), and Ms (s2) < M0
s (s2); and (iii) M (s) < M0 (s) for
all s 2 (s0;s1) and M (s) > M0 (s) for all s 2 (s1;s2). At this point, there are two possible
cases: ￿1 < b ￿ and ￿1 ￿ b ￿. If ￿1 < b ￿, we can follow the same steps as in the proof of Lemma
5 using ￿0 and ￿1. Formally, condition (ii) implies

























w(s1). The former inequality cannot
hold because B ￿s B0 for all ￿ < b ￿, whereas the latter cannot hold because of Equation
(11), the log-supermodularity of A, and condition (iii). This completes our proof in the case
￿1 < b ￿. If ￿1 ￿ b ￿, we can again follow the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 5, but using
￿1 and ￿2. The formal argument is identical and omitted. QED.
B Proofs (II): The World Economy










￿HVH (s) + ￿FVF (s)








The proof that VH ￿a VF () VW ￿a VF is similar. QED.Matching and Inequality 35





























The proof that BH ￿s BF () BW ￿s BF is similar. QED.
Proof of Lemma 9. By de￿nition, VH ￿d VF implies VF ￿a VH, for all s < b s, and
VH ￿a VF, for all s ￿ b s. Thus, the result follows from Lemma 7 applied separately to s < b s
and s ￿ b s. QED.
Proof of Lemma 10. De￿ne W (i;j) ￿ ￿i
R s
s w(s;j)V (s;i)ds, where i = 1 for Foreign
and i = 2 for Home; j = 1 under BW and j = 2 under B0
W; w(s;j) is the World wage
function for j = 1;2; and V (s;i) = Vi (s). The fact that VH ￿a VF implies that V (s;i) is
log-supermodular. According to Inequality (17), w(s;j) is also log-supermodular. Since log-
supermodularity is preserved by multiplication and integration, W (i;j) is log-supermodular;






















￿HVH (s) + ￿FVF (s)
￿HVH (s0) + ￿FVF (s0)
￿
￿HVH (s) + ￿0
FVF (s)










C Proofs (III): Discrete Number of Goods and Factors
As mentioned in the main text, we consider the case of a discrete number of factors indexed
j = 1;::::;M such that s1 < ::: < sM, and a discrete number of sectors indexed by k = 1;:::;N
such that ￿1 < ::: < ￿N. We use the following notation ￿(s) ￿ f￿ 2 ￿jL(s;￿) > 0g
and S (￿) ￿ fs 2 SjL(s;￿) > 0g, where L(s;￿) is the allocation of workers to sectors in
a competitive equilibrium. For any ￿ 2 ￿ and s 2 S, we let ￿(s;￿) ￿ L(s;￿)=V (s).
For any ￿ 2 ￿, we let s(￿) ￿ inf S (￿) and s(￿) ￿ supS (￿); and for any s 2 S, weMatching and Inequality 36
let ￿ (s) ￿ inf ￿(s) and ￿ (s) ￿ sup￿(s). We use similar notation for the assignment
functions under V 0. Finally, for any ￿ 2 ￿, we say that L ￿￿ L0 if ￿(s;￿) ￿ ￿
0 (s;￿) for all
s 2 S (￿) [ S0 (￿) with strict inequality for at least one s.
C.1 Preliminary results
Throughout this Appendix, we make use of the following results.
Lemma 12 Suppose that there exist ￿ > ￿0 such that L ￿￿ L0 and L0 ￿￿0 L. Then V ￿a V 0
implies Y (￿)=Y 0 (￿) > Y (￿0)=Y 0 (￿0).
Proof. By de￿nition, we know that Y (￿) =
X
s2S(￿) ￿(s;￿)V (s). Since ￿(s;￿) = 0
for all s = 2 S (￿), we get Y (￿) =
X
s2S(￿)[S0(￿) ￿(s;￿)V (s). Similarly, we have Y 0 (￿) =
X
s2S(￿)[S0(￿) ￿







s2S(￿)[S0(￿) ￿(s;￿)V 0 (s)
. (49)







s02S(￿0)[S0(￿0) ￿(s0;￿0)V 0 (s0)
. (50)









s02S(￿0)[S0(￿0) ￿(s0;￿0)V 0 (s0)
. (51)









s02S(￿0) ￿(s0;￿0)V 0 (s0)
.Matching and Inequality 37

















By PAM, we know that ￿ > ￿0 implies s ￿ s0 for all s 2 S (￿) and s0 2 S (￿0). In addition,
V ￿a V 0 implies V (s)V 0 (s0) ￿ V (s0)V 0 (s) for all s ￿ s0. Hence the previous inequality
must hold. Combining Inequalities (49)-(51), we obtain Y (￿)=Y 0 (￿) > Y (￿0)Y 0 (￿0).
Lemma 13 For any ￿ 2 ￿, if s 2 (s(￿);s(￿)), then ￿(s;￿) = 1.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. If ￿(s;￿) 6= 1, then there must be ￿0 6= ￿ such that





















Lemma 14 For any pair sectors ￿ ￿ ￿0, if there exist s ￿ s0 such that s0 2 S (￿) and
s 2 S0 (￿0), then: (i) p0 (￿0)=p0 (￿) ￿ p(￿0)=p(￿); and (ii) Y (￿0)=Y 0 (￿0) ￿ Y (￿)=Y 0 (￿).
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0 (￿) ￿ p(￿
0)=p(￿).




0 (￿) ￿ Y (￿
0)=Y (￿).




0) ￿ Y (￿)=Y
0 (￿).
This completes the proof of Lemma 14.
C.2 Skill abundance and matching
We are now ready to derive the counterpart of Lemma 3 in the discrete case.
Theorem 1 Suppose that V ￿a V 0, then S0 (￿) ￿ S (￿) (SSO) for all ￿ 2 ￿.
Proof We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exists ￿ 2 ￿ such that S0 (￿) ￿
S (￿). So we can de￿ne ￿k = inf f￿ 2 ￿jS0 (￿) ￿ S (￿)g. The rest of the proof is decomposed
into 4 Lemmas.
Lemma 15 There exists ￿0 ￿ ￿k such that: (i) either s(￿0) < s0 (￿0) or s(￿0) ￿ s0 (￿0) and
￿
0 [s(￿0);￿0] > ￿[s(￿0);￿0]; (ii) s(￿0) ￿ s0 (￿0); and (iii) Y (￿0)=Y 0 (￿0) ￿ Y (￿k)=Y 0 (￿k).
Proof. There are two possible cases.
Case 1: s0 (￿k) ￿ s(￿k). In this case, S0 (￿k) ￿ S (￿k) implies s(￿k) < s0 (￿k). Therefore
￿0 ￿ ￿k trivially satis￿es conditions (i)-(iii).
Case 2: s(￿k) < s0 (￿k). In this case, we ￿rst show the existence of ￿0 < ￿k such that
s(￿0) ￿ s0 (￿0) and ￿
0 [s(￿0);￿0] > ￿[s(￿0);￿0]. We proceed in three steps. First noteMatching and Inequality 39
that S0 (￿) ￿ S (￿) for all ￿ < ￿k. Hence we must have ￿ [s(￿k)] ￿ ￿0 [s(￿k)]. Second
note that s(￿k) < s0 (￿k) implies ￿0 [s(￿k)] < ￿k. Combining these two observations, we
get ￿0 [s(￿k)] ￿ ￿[s(￿k)]. Thus there must be ￿0 2 ￿0 [s(￿k)] such that ￿0 < ￿k and
￿
0 [s(￿k);￿0] > ￿[s(￿k);￿0]. Third note that PAM implies s(￿k) = s(￿) for all ￿ 2
￿[s(￿k)]. Therefore we have s(￿k) = s(￿0), and in turn, ￿
0 [s(￿0);￿0] > ￿[s(￿0);￿0].
Since ￿0 2 ￿0 [s(￿k)], we further have s0 (￿0) ￿ s(￿k) = s(￿0). Hence condition (i) is
satis￿ed. We now turn to conditions (ii) and (iii). Since S0 (￿) ￿ S (￿) for all ￿ < ￿k,
￿0 < ￿k directly implies condition (ii). To show that Y (￿0)=Y 0 (￿0) ￿ Y (￿k)=Y 0 (￿k), we
use Lemma 14. By construction, we have ￿k ￿ ￿0, s(￿k) 2 S (￿k), and s(￿k) 2 S0 (￿0).
Therefore Lemma 14 directly implies condition (iii).
Lemma 16 There exists ￿0 ￿ ￿k such that: (i) either s(￿0) < s0 (￿0) or s(￿0) ￿ s0 (￿0)
and ￿[s(￿0);￿0] > ￿
0 [s(￿0);￿0]; and (ii) Y (￿k)=Y 0 (￿k) ￿ Y (￿0)=Y 0 (￿0).
Proof. Since S0 (￿k) ￿ S (￿k), there are two possible cases.
Case 1: s(￿k) < s0 (￿k). In this case, ￿0 ￿ ￿k trivially satis￿es conditions (i) and (ii).
Case 2: s(￿k) < s0 (￿k). In this case, PAM implies s(￿k+1) ￿ s0 (￿k+1). We now distinguish
between two separate subcases.
Case 2-a: s(￿k+1) < s0 (￿k+1). In this subcase, ￿0 ￿ ￿k+1 trivially satis￿es condition
(i). To show that Y (￿k)=Y 0 (￿k) ￿ Y (￿0)=Y 0 (￿0), we use Lemma 14. By PAM, we have
s = s0 (￿k) ￿ s0 = s(￿k+1) such that s0 2 S (￿k+1) and s 2 S0 (￿k). Lemma 14 therefore
implies Y (￿k)=Y 0 (￿k) ￿ Y 0 (￿k+1)=Y (￿k+1), and in turn, condition (ii).
Case 2-b: s(￿k+1) = s0 (￿k+1). In this subcase, PAM implies s(￿k) < s(￿k+1) and s0 (￿k) =
s0 (￿k+1). Hence we have ￿ [s(￿k+1)] > ￿0 [s(￿k+1)]. If ￿ [s(￿k+1)] > ￿0 [s(￿k+1)], then we can
set ￿0 ￿ ￿ [s(￿k+1)], which satis￿es s(￿0) < s0 (￿0), and so, condition (i); and, by Lemma 14,
condition (ii) is satis￿ed as well. If, on the other hand, ￿ [s(￿k+1)] ￿ ￿0 [s(￿k+1)], then we
have ￿[s(￿k+1)] ￿ ￿0 [s(￿k+1)]. Therefore, there must be ￿0 2 ￿[s(￿k+1)] such that ￿0 > ￿k
and ￿[s(￿k+1);￿0] > ￿
0 [s(￿k+1);￿0]. Finally note that PAM implies s(￿k+1) = s(￿) for all
￿ 2 ￿[s(￿k+1)]. Thus we have s(￿k+1) = s(￿0), and in turn, ￿[s(￿0);￿0] > ￿
0 [s(￿0);￿0].
By construction, we have s(￿0) = s0 (￿0) = s(￿k+1), and so, condition (i) is satis￿ed. By
Lemma 14, condition (ii) is satis￿ed as well.
Lemma 17 There exists a sequence (sn;￿n) such that: (i) sn = s(￿n￿1) = s0 (￿n￿1) with
￿(sn;￿n￿1) > ￿
0 (sn;￿n￿1); and (ii) ￿n = ￿ (sn) = ￿0 (sn) with ￿
0 (sn;￿n) > ￿(sn;￿n).Matching and Inequality 40
Proof. To construct a sequence (sn;￿n) satisfying conditions (i) and (ii), we iterate the
following steps.
Step 1: There exists s1 such that s1 = s(￿0) = s0 (￿0) with ￿(s1;￿0) > ￿
0 (s1;￿0).
We set s1 = s(￿0). To show that s(￿0) = s0 (￿0) and ￿[s(￿0);￿0] > ￿
0 [s(￿0);￿0], we
then proceed by contradiction. Suppose that s(￿0) 6= s0 (￿0) or that s(￿0) = s0 (￿0) and
￿[s(￿0);￿0] ￿ ￿
0 [s(￿0);￿0].
Step 1.1: L0 ￿￿0 L. This directly derives from Lemma 13, Lemma 15 conditions (i) and (ii),
and the assumption that s(￿0) 6= s0 (￿0) or s(￿0) = s0 (￿0) and ￿[s(￿0);￿0] ￿ ￿
0 [s(￿0);￿0].
Step 1.2: There exist ￿ ￿ ￿k such that L ￿￿ L0 and Y (￿k)=Y 0 (￿k) ￿ Y (￿)=Y 0 (￿).
We use the following iterative procedure. If s(￿0) > s0 (￿0) or s(￿0) = s0 (￿0) with
￿[s(￿0);￿0] ￿ ￿
0 [s(￿0);￿0], then by Lemma 16, we set ￿ = ￿0 and stop. Otherwise,
we show that there exists ￿1 > ￿0 such that: (i) s(￿1) < s0 (￿1) or s(￿1) ￿ s0 (￿1) and
￿[s(￿1);￿1] > ￿
0 [s(￿1);￿1]; and (ii) Y (￿k)=Y 0 (￿k) ￿ Y (￿1)=Y 0 (￿1). To do so, we con-
sider two cases separately. If s(￿0) < s0 (￿0), the same argument as in Lemma 16 case
2 implies the existence of ￿1 > ￿0 satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). If s(￿0) = s0 (￿0)
and ￿[s(￿0);￿0] < ￿
0 [s(￿0);￿0], we ￿rst note that by Lemma 16, we necessarily have
s(￿0) 6= s(￿0), which implies ￿ [s(￿0)] = ￿0, and in turn, ￿ [s(￿0)] ￿ ￿0 [s(￿0)]. We
can then use the same argument as in Lemma 16 case 2-b to establish the existence of
￿1 > ￿0 satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). If s(￿1) > s0 (￿1) or s(￿1) = s0 (￿1) with
￿[s(￿1);￿1] ￿ ￿
0 [s(￿1);￿1], we set ￿ = ￿1 and stop. Otherwise, we show, using the
same argument as before, that there exists ￿2 > ￿0 such that: (i) s(￿2) < s0 (￿2) or
s(￿2) ￿ s0 (￿2) and ￿[s(￿2);￿2] > ￿
0 [s(￿2);￿2]; and (ii) Y (￿k)=Y 0 (￿k) ￿ Y (￿2)=Y 0 (￿2)
etc... Since there only are a ￿nite number of values of ￿ and since ￿[s;￿] ￿ ￿
0 [s;￿] if
s(￿) 6= s(￿), such an algorithm must converge towards ￿ ￿ ￿k such that L ￿￿ L0 and
Y (￿k)=Y 0 (￿k) ￿ Y (￿)=Y 0 (￿):
To conclude the proof of Step 1, we use Lemma 12. Combining Lemma 12 with Step 1.1,
Step 1.2, and V ￿a V 0, we get Y (￿0)=Y 0 (￿0) < Y (￿)=Y 0 (￿). By Lemma 15 and Step 1.2,
we have Y (￿0)=Y 0 (￿0) ￿ Y (￿k)=Y 0 (￿k) ￿ Y (￿)=Y 0 (￿). A contradiction.
Step 2: There exists ￿1 such that ￿1 = ￿ (s1) = ￿0 (s1) with ￿
0 (s1;￿1) > ￿(s1;￿1).
The formal argument used in Step 2 and all subsequent steps is similar to the one used
in Step 1 and is omitted.Matching and Inequality 41
Lemma 18 There exists n ￿ 1 such that sn = sn+1.
Proof. By construction, we have sn+1 ￿ sn for all n. By assumption, we also have sn ￿ s1
for all n. Combining these two observations, there must n ￿ 1 such that sn = sn+1.
(Proof of Theorem 1 continued). To conclude the proof of Theorem 1, note that
sn = sn+1 implies ￿n￿1 = ￿n. Therefore, we must also have ￿(sn;￿n￿1) > ￿
0 (sn;￿n￿1) and
￿
0 (sn;￿n) > ￿(sn;￿n). A contradiction.
C.3 Skill abundance and wages
Like in the continuum-by-continuum case, changes in matching caused by changes in skill
abundance have strong implications for the distribution of wages.
Theorem 2 Suppose that V ￿a V 0. Then w(s)=w(s0) ￿ w0 (s)=w0 (s0) for all s0 ￿ s.
Proof We ￿rst show that p0 (￿k+1)=p0 (￿k) ￿ p(￿k+1)=p(￿k) for any pair of adjacent sectors
￿1 ￿ ￿k < ￿k+1 ￿ ￿N. We consider two cases separately.
Case 1: There exist s ￿ s0 such that s 2 S (￿k) and s0 2 S0 (￿k+1). In this case, Lemma 14
directly implies p0 (￿k+1)=p0 (￿k) ￿ p(￿k+1)=p(￿k).
Case 2: There does not exist s ￿ s0 such that s 2 S (￿k) and s0 2 S0 (￿k+1). By Theorem
1, we know that V ￿a V 0 implies S0 (￿) ￿ S (￿) (SSO) for all ￿ 2 ￿. We can therefore use
the following lemmas.
Lemma 19 For any pair of adjacent sectors ￿1 ￿ ￿k < ￿k+1 ￿ ￿N, if there does not exist
s ￿ s0 such that s 2 S (￿k) and s0 2 S0 (￿k+1), then S0 (￿) ￿ S (￿) (SSO) for all ￿ 2 ￿
implies: (i) supS (￿k) = supS0 (￿k) = sm; and (ii) inf S (￿k+1) = inf S0 (￿k+1) = sm+1 for
1 ￿ sm < sM.
Proof. Let sm+1 = inf S0 (￿k+1) for 1 ￿ m < M. If there does not exist s ￿ s0 such that
s 2 S (￿k) and s0 2 S0 (￿k+1), then supS (￿k) < inf S0 (￿k+1), which can be rearranged as
supS (￿k) ￿ sm. By PAM, we know that supS0 (￿k) ￿ sm. By assumption, we also know
that supS (￿k) ￿ supS0 (￿k). Combining the last three inequalities, we obtain supS (￿k) =
supS0 (￿k) = sm. The argument for property (ii) is similar. On the one hand, S0 (￿) ￿ S (￿)
(SSO) for all ￿ 2 ￿ implies sm+1 = inf S0 (￿k+1) ￿ inf S (￿k+1). On the other hand, PAM
and supS (￿k) = sm imply inf S (￿k+1) ￿ sm+1. Combining the last two inequalities, we
obtain inf S (￿k+1) = inf S0 (￿k+1) = sm+1. This completes the proof of Lemma 19.Matching and Inequality 42
Lemma 20 Suppose that ￿k and ￿k+1 satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) in Lemma 19. Then
we must have L0 ￿￿k L and L ￿￿k+1 L0.
Proof. The formal argument is similar to the one used in Lemma 17 and omitted.
(Proof of Theorem 2 continued). Since V ￿a V 0, Lemmas 12 and 20 imply
Y (￿k+1)=Y
0 (￿k+1) > Y (￿k)=Y
0 (￿k).
Combining the previous inequality with CES preferences, we obtain
p
0 (￿k+1)=p
0 (￿k) ￿ p(￿k+1)=p(￿k).
At this point, we have shown that p0 (￿k+1)=p0 (￿k) ￿ p(￿k+1)=p(￿k) for any pair of adjacent
sectors ￿1 ￿ ￿k < ￿k+1 ￿ ￿N. By transitivity, this implies p0 (￿)=p0 (￿0) ￿ p(￿)=p(￿0) for
any pair of sectors ￿0 ￿ ￿. To conclude, we note that the previous inequality, PAM, and the
zero pro￿t condition imply w(s)=w(s0) ￿ w0 (s)=w0 (s0) for all s0 ￿ s. QED.
D Proofs (IV): Observable versus Unobservable Skills
Proof of Proposition 6. We ￿rst demonstrate part (i) of Inequality (29) for the Home
country. Let w(s;x) ￿ wH (s) if x = 1 and w(s;x) ￿ wT (s) if x = 2. By Inequality
(21), w(s;x) is log-supermodular. By assumption, VH (s;e) is log-supermodular. We know
that log-supermodularity is preserved by multiplication and integration; see e.g. Karlin and
Rinott (1980). Therefore w(e;x) ￿
R





wT(e0). The argument in the Foreign country is similar. Part (ii)
directly derives from the fact that Inequality (21) holds for all s ￿ s0. QED.
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